---
title: CVE-2026-98432 exploitation attempt on an exposed host
description: Datadog, the leading service for cloud-scale monitoring.
breadcrumbs: >-
  Docs > Datadog Security > OOTB Rules > CVE-2026-98432 exploitation attempt on
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---

> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://docs.datadoghq.com/llms.txt).

# CVE-2026-98432 exploitation attempt on an exposed host
Classification:attackTactic:[TA0001-initial-access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001)Technique:[T1190-exploit-public-facing-application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190) 
## What happened{% #what-happened %}

Host `{{ host }}` is in a configuration that exposes CVE-2026-98432 and, within the evaluation window, received a sustained burst of TCP SYNs carrying IPv4 header options — the on-the-wire trigger for the kernel use-after-free. Depending on which case fired, the exposing setting is either `net.mptcp.enabled = 1` or `net.ipv4.tcp_migrate_req = 1`.

## Goal{% #goal %}

Raise a high-fidelity signal only when an exploitation attempt against CVE-2026-98432 lands on a host whose configuration makes it exploitable. CVE-2026-98432 is an unauthenticated remote use-after-free in the Linux IPv4 TCP handshake path (CVSS 9.8) that an attacker can escalate to code execution as root. The standalone packet detection fires on any options-bearing SYN; this correlation gates that trigger on an exposing precondition and on trigger *volume*, cutting false positives from benign IPv4-options traffic.

## Strategy{% #strategy %}

The bug: when a SYN carries IPv4 options (Record Route / Timestamp), the kernel stores them on the request socket (`ireq_opt`) and reuses them when building the SYN-ACK. A *retransmitted* SYN racing handshake completion can have another CPU read those options in `ip_options_build()` after they are freed — a use-after-free. Winning the race requires many retransmitted SYNs, so real exploitation shows as a sustained burst, not a single packet.

The rule correlates agent-event streams on the same `host`, with two cases for the two known exposure paths:

1. **Exposing config** — `sysctl_snapshot` events reporting either `@sysctl.proc.sys.net.mptcp.enabled:1` (the demonstrated exploit precondition) or `@sysctl.proc.sys.net.ipv4.tcp_migrate_req:1` (request-socket migration, a second path to the same UAF).
1. **Exploit trigger at volume** — `ipv4_options_on_tcp_syn` (a TCP SYN whose IPv4 header carries options) seen at least 100 times within the window, approximating the retransmission spray the race needs.

Both the `mptcp_host` and `migrate_req_host` cases are **critical**: the impact (root RCE) is identical regardless of which setting exposes it. The case name tells you which setting to remediate.

`sysctl_snapshot` is emitted at agent startup and on a schedule, so `evaluationWindow` is one hour to capture a recent snapshot alongside the trigger burst; if a host's snapshot cadence is longer than the window, the config leg can age out and the correlation will not fire until the next snapshot.

## Triage and response{% #triage-and-response %}

1. **Patch first.** Confirm the host runs a kernel affected by CVE-2026-98432 and apply the fixed vendor kernel, then **reboot** — installing the package alone does not take effect until reboot.
1. **Interim mitigation by path** (defense-in-depth only, not a fix):
   - `cve_2026_98432_trigger_on_mptcp_host` → disable MPTCP where not required: `sysctl -w net.mptcp.enabled=0`.
   - `cve_2026_98432_trigger_on_migrate_req_host` → disable request migration where not required: `sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_migrate_req=0`.
   - Either case → optionally drop inbound IPv4 TCP packets carrying IP options at the host or network edge, which removes the trigger condition entirely.
1. Identify the source address of the options-bearing SYNs and whether it is expected to reach this host.
1. Rule out benign IPv4-options sources (some traceroute and path-measurement tooling sets Record Route or Timestamp). Note that benign tooling sends a handful of probes, whereas the `>= 100` threshold targets the sustained spray of an exploitation attempt; allowlist known sources.
1. If the source is untrusted, block it at the network edge and inspect the host for crash, oops, or KASAN indicators mentioning `ip_options_build`, `ip_build_and_send_pkt`, or `inet_opt` / `ireq_opt`.
