---
title: CVE-2026-109618 PHP2Shell exploitation detected
description: Datadog, the leading service for cloud-scale monitoring.
breadcrumbs: >-
  Docs > Datadog Security > OOTB Rules > CVE-2026-109618 PHP2Shell exploitation
  detected
---

> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://docs.datadoghq.com/llms.txt).

# CVE-2026-109618 PHP2Shell exploitation detected
Classification:attackTactic:[TA0001-initial-access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001)Technique:[T1190-exploit-public-facing-application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190) 
## Goal{% #goal %}

Detect exploitation of CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 (PHP2Shell), PHP multipart and session upload-progress memory corruption vulnerabilities that enable remote code execution.

## Strategy{% #strategy %}

Exploitation attempts crash PHP workers, and successful exploitation runs attacker code inside a worker. The request payloads are filler, so the primary rules watch the worker process instead of the network. A supplementary packet canary flags the exploit payload itself on cleartext ingress.

- **Critical:** A PHP worker (`php-fpm`, `php-cgi`, `lsphp`) spawned a shell, downloader, interpreter, or memfd binary within 15 minutes of a worker crash in the same container.
- **High:** A PHP worker spawned one of those programs with no recent worker crash.
- **Medium:** A PHP worker exited with code 70 (the pre-request memory-limit fatal of the arm stage) or crashed with SIGSEGV (the fire stage). Every qualifying crash refreshes the 15-minute Critical correlation window; the backend deduplicates the Medium signal per container.
- **Medium (stream):** The PHP2Shell exploit payload was observed on the wire — a large packet whose payload begins with the `Z`-filler run (`0x5A5A5A5A`) or the forged `HT_MIN_MASK` table mask (`0xFEFFFFFF`). Fires once per host per 5 minutes.

`sendmail` invocations from PHP `mail()` are excluded. Some applications legitimately run shell commands from PHP; baseline the High case before alerting on it.

The stream match is a best-effort canary, not the backbone. It only sees **cleartext IPv4** traffic at the host and keys on the **public PoC's** byte shape, so TLS-terminated ingress, IPv6, reshaped payloads, or bytes that do not land at the start of a captured segment all evade it (the capture window is 256 bytes per packet, and `packet.filter` is a fixed-offset BPF match with no content search). Its process attribution is the **sending** side (for example an ingress proxy or `docker-proxy`), not the targeted PHP worker, so it correlates host-wide and by time only — it does not share the `cgroup`-scoped correlation of the crash and exec legs. Treat it as "exploit attempt seen"; rely on the worker legs for confirmation of success.

## Triage and response{% #triage-and-response %}

1. Identify the workload from `@container.id` and `host`, and the program the worker ran from `@process.executable.path` and `@process.args`.
1. For Critical and High signals, look for outbound connections, downloads, or memfd executions from the same container.
1. For Medium signals, check the web server access log for large multipart POSTs from one source around the crash, followed by 500 or 502 responses.
   - For stream Medium signals, map the destination port to the service and correlate with any worker crash or exec on that host; a stream signal with no worker crash is likely a blocked or failed attempt.
1. Confirm the PHP version is below 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36, or 8.2.35.
1. Isolate the host or terminate the container, then patch PHP and restart PHP-FPM or CGI workers.
1. Until patched, set `session.upload_progress.enabled=Off`.

*Requires Agent version 7.68 or greater.*
